Constitutional Concerns Over Supreme Court Ruling Allowing Presidential Dismissal of Independent Agency Heads
The author argues that the Supreme Court’s Slaughter decision, which permits the president to fire heads of independent agencies, misclassifies those bodies as executive rather than legislative.
A columnist reflects on the Supreme Court’s Slaughter opinion, which holds that the president may dismiss any head of an independent agency within the executive branch. The majority opinion rests on the premise that all executive power resides with the president, necessitating control over agency leadership. The writer, however, feels uneasy because he believes many of these agencies operate as legislative bodies, not executive ones.
This discomfort became clear while he was preparing an article on the president’s tariff powers. He argues that the decision blurs the constitutional distinction between legislative and executive functions, raising a “small-c” constitutional problem. The piece serves as a critique of the Court’s reasoning and its broader implications for the separation of powers.
Why it matters
It highlights a potential shift in how constitutional authority over independent agencies is interpreted, affecting the balance of power.
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